The *StratJournal* is a bi-monthly publication of the Office of Naval Strategic Studies devoted to strategic, national, regional, and international issues, and developments that have significant impact on maritime security and naval defense.

**About US:** The Office of Naval Strategic Studies (ONSS) is one of the research institutions of the Philippine Navy primarily mandated to examine the dynamics of the strategic and policy environment and the developments in military affairs in order to provide sound and research-based recommendations for the PN Command. The Office provides avenues and platforms for open and constructive discussions on prevailing and evolving defense and security issues to broaden perspectives, and cultivate a culture of strategic thinking in the PN.
The Balangay Fleet

In 2009, three wooden sailboats, named Diwata ng Lahi, Masawa Hong Butuan, and Sama ng Tawi-Tawi, set off from Mindanao to parts of Southeast Asia. They were traditionally fashioned after the balangay, the ancient vessels described in 16th-century ethnohistoric accounts and resembling the watercrafts archaeologically-recovered in Butuan City. Its crew was composed of the Sama Dilaya boat-builders of Tawi-Tawi, mountaineers, and members of the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy. They sailed to Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam for almost seventeen months without using modern navigation technologies, relying only to the winds and the stars, as our seafaring ancestors did. This was mountaineer Arturo Valdez’s vision to bring the balangay back to life and put them out again to the sea to retrace ancient trade and diplomatic routes in the Southeast Asian region.

After almost a decade, two more balangays, Lahing Maharlika and Sultan Sin Sulu, together with the veteran Sama ng Tawi-Tawi, set sail again from Mindanao, but now, the goal was to reach China. Similarly, the watercrafts were made from endemic timbers from the Philippine archipelago and methodically
crafted using age-old manufacturing techniques, except that they are already powered by motors and communication equipment to be able to dock in Chinese ports. Around thirty Filipinos were aboard the vessels and they traversed the West Philippine Sea for twenty-two days. The new objective was to go through the journey of Sultan Paduka Batara of Sulu who paid tribute to China’s Ming dynasty emperor Yong Le in 1417.

Balangay in Butuan

The balangay, as an object of historical importance, was brought into the consciousness of the Filipinos in the 1970s, when remains of ancient watercrafts were discovered in Butuan, Northeast Mindanao. Since 1976, a total of eleven boats have been unearthed by archaeologists from the Philippine National Museum. These watercrafts, varying from around fifteen to twenty-five meters in length, are scattered throughout the barrios of Doongan and Libertad, in portions believed to be banks of ancient rivers and streams. The balangays are particularly admirable since it is composed of planks joined together by pins and dowels, or pegs, all of which are made of local timbers, showcasing the early population’s superb manufacturing skills. Within their pits and in nearby areas, an array of human and animal remains and cultural materials, ranging from wooden coffins, earthenware, stoneware, and tradeware ceramics, metal fragments, as well as gold ornaments, were found. All of these artifacts are used by archaeologists as evidences to explore Butuan’s economic and political relationships with cultures within the Philippine archipelago, Southeast Asia, and China, from around 7th to 12th century CE.

In 1987, the balangays of Butuan were declared National Cultural Treasures by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 86 and the whole city as important archaeological site protected under Republic Act 4846. In 2015, House Bill 986 was proposed to recognize these ancient watercrafts as the Philippine’s national boat, since they symbolize our “country’s rich ancient maritime history.”

Early Connections to Southeast Asia and China

Archaeological researches have demonstrated that the early populations, that inhabited what is now the Philippine archipelago, had reached many parts of Southeast and China as early as the 7th to the 12th century CE, through locally-manufactured watercrafts, such as the balangays. The historical records also attest to these interactions across high seas.

The inscription in a copperplate found in Laguna, dated to around 10th-century CE, codified political and economic alliances between kingdoms in southern Luzon as well as Java, in present-day Indonesia. Also during the 10th century CE, the Sung Shih (宋史), or the Dynastic History of Song, mentioned a place called Ma’i, located somewhere in southern Luzon, whose people had traded with the populations of Borneo, now part of Malaysia, and Champa, in present-day Vietnam. The same dynastic history recorded the yearly attempts of P’u-tuan (Butuan) in securing a tributary status from China from 1001 CE to 1011 CE, by enticing the emperor with exotic products from this part of the world. Chao ju-kua, the superintendent of maritime trade in Ch’uan-chu Province in Southern China in 13th century, noted these trade goods, such as beeswax, cotton, pearls, and gold, among others, in his Chu fan-chih (諸蕃志), or Account of the Various Barbarians. The Ming Shih (明史), or the Dynastic History of Song as well as the Ming Shih Lu (明实录), or the Veritable Records, also documented the 14th- and 15th-century Philippine tribute missions to...
the empire.\textsuperscript{14} China’s grant of tributary statuses was its primary strategy in dealing with what it considered to be less civilized cultures in the region.\textsuperscript{15} Partial, as it may appear, the conduct of missions by the communities in the Philippine archipelago can however be seen as an active negotiation of their political and economic powers. It was a bargain and a showcase of distance travelled, labor, and resources being pulled together to accomplish the task.

\textbf{Towards a Filipino Maritime Diplomacy}

History and archaeology suggest that the sea did not hinder the early Philippine populations’ pursuit to establish ties with their neighboring cultures and empires. The waters proved to be an arena that invites every one of them to interact with one another; after all, they were all part of the larger maritime sphere. More than natural borders, these bodies of water were turned to avenues and passageways that linked trades, peoples, ideas, and cultures in the region. In these avenues power relations between and among communities were negotiated.

This paper explored the whim of the early communities in the Philippine archipelago to go out to the sea and connect with other cultures. This urge to showcase what we have and what we can do together is also evident today by the way the balangays were recreated, their routes retraced, and their past acquaintances once again visited. In this brief interrogation, we are able to take a glimpse on how we had negotiated our position in the maritime sphere, a valuable insight to our diplomatic approach as Filipinos.

The balangay might not have been the only watercraft used by our ancestors in crossing the seas, but it has proven itself to be an effective representation of how proud we are with our maritime tradition, a tangible symbol of our maritime consciousness. Our early population built these vessels using our people’s ingenuity, making the most out of our own skills and resources. They had used it as a dwelling place for their kin as well as a means to travel from one island.

One of the balangays in Butuan during the 1977 excavation

\textbf{PHOTO: National Museum}
to another. In our modern times, the balangay, has been appropriated to identify the smallest political unit in the country. Extending this to the concept of relating with other cultures, therefore, brings community and cooperation. They were not simply watercrafts that carried people and goods from one place to another but most importantly they were vessels that brought our ancestors’ determination, resilience, and persistence in dealing as well as negotiating with other communities. The balangay carries this Filipino brand of diplomacy. 

END NOTES:


About the Author

Victor Estrella earned his Master of Arts in Archaeology from the Archaeological Studies Program of the University of the Philippines Diliman. He was a Hughes Research Fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) of the University of Michigan, and a Writeshop Fellow of the UP Diliman Third World Studies Centre (TWSC) in 2018. He was also a Graduate Fellow at the Asia Research Institute (ARI) of the National University of Singapore in 2016. His research and publications focus on pre-modern Southeast Asia and the protohistorical period in the Philippines. He is currently a member of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Ateneo de Manila University and of the Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences of the Philippine Normal University Manila.
Developments in Chinese Military Drone Technology as a Challenge to the Philippine Navy

By Kirk Patrick S. Pablo

Advancements in drone technology have warranted the development of systems and platforms that have the capability to counter their deployment. With China developing its unmanned capabilities in aerial, surface/subsurface, and amphibious operations, the Philippine Navy is presented a challenge: adapt or be compromised.

The rapid development of unmanned systems has played an increasing role in military applications all over the world. Its influence in defining the conduct of warfare and surveillance has also produced concepts, platforms, and technologies that challenge existing notions of security. As a rising power, China has been keen in developing technologies that will help in extending its reach in regional and global affairs. The burgeoning influence of Chinese military drones in aerial, surface and subsurface surveillance, amphibious, as well as logistical missions in the South China Sea is highly evident, and more can be observed in the coming years.

With these new strategic realities in the disputed region, a question needs to be asked: what can the Navy do to effectively respond to the challenges posed by these emerging threats in order to ensure the integrity of our territorial waters?
China: A Rising Drone ‘Juggernaut’

China’s military is quickly becoming a ‘dronified’ institution. The PLA has swiftly adapted a range of unmanned vehicles for use across its army, navy, air force, and rocket forces. In fact, reports confirm that the People’s Liberation Army Navy has been using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles from smaller tactical drones to MALE/MAME platforms such as Aisheng ASN 209 ‘Silver Eagle’ and Harbin BZK-005 to conduct maritime ISR operations in certain disputed areas in the South China Sea.

On top of that, the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex is aggressively becoming one of the largest contributors to the ‘dronification’ of battlespaces in developing countries such as African and Middle Eastern states. In fact, in early 2018, the Iraqi Air Force released a video showcasing its Chinese-made CASC CH-4B drones in its campaign to reclaim large swaths of its territory from the Islamic State.

Thus, China is quickly positioning itself as a drone ‘juggernaut’; its ability to mass produce and export unmanned technology significantly reduces the price of acquiring these platforms because of economies of scale. Consequently, this contributes to the increasing lethality in the capacity of smaller states to combat their adversaries because of easier access to these strategic capabilities. With these developments, we can concur that the adoption of such technologies not only provides smaller states the opportunity to employ unmanned vehicle technology to effectively conduct military operations through the use of drones, but these realities prop up the possibility of China becoming a drone superpower. In this context, it amplifies the ability of the Chinese Armed Forces to project greater influence in international affairs, as well as strengthen its claims in disputed geopolitical arenas. This leaves less-capable states such as the Philippines at a severe disadvantage in two dimensions: from conventional military capabilities wherein the fledgling Philippine Navy is unable to keep parity with the considerably bigger Chinese naval power, and in the asymmetrical front, given that the smaller PN will be easily be neutralized through unconventional means. In sum, the inclusion of these technologies in the ethos of Chinese strategic thinking will definitely affect the future conduct of maritime and aerial operations in the South China Sea, and potentially spill over to the West Philippine Sea.

David’s Sling: Countering the Threat of Unmanned Vehicles in the West Philippine Sea

The Philippine defense establishment should be compelled to invest in such systems in order to keep up with technological advances that can be instrumental in enforcing our sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea. Acquiring these technologies can help deter Chinese territorial ambitions in the area through the active and passive denial of the sea in all possible dimensions. Moreover, the PN can invest in augmenting conventional platforms, as well as dedicated anti-drone technology. Emerging technologies such as kinetic, direct-energy, as well as signals and cyber weapons should be considered by the PN, given that unmanned vehicles will evidently influence the conduct of warfare in the years to come. Signals-based, area denial platforms such as Rafael’s Drone Dome, as well as kinetic-based systems such as the Raytheon Coyote UAS could be of great use for the Philippine Navy. A sea-based variant of such platforms, combined with dedicated cyberwarfare components, can serve as a layered defense against unmanned threats. This layered network of counter-drone technologies
can help in responding to both conventional and asymmetrical dimensions of naval operations. Although still in its nascent stages, these cutting-edge technologies will certainly increase in prominence and usage, a prospect that PN has to anticipate and prepare for.

END NOTES:

5 Male – Medium Altitude, Long Endurance. MAME – Medium Altitude, Medium Endurance.
6 Huang, 2018
Is the Philippine Navy Affiliated Reserve Unit (PNARU) a Potential Force Multiplier?

By: Kyle Esther E. Cardona

- China’s gray zone operations in the West Philippine Sea have affected not only the Philippine’s territorial rights and strategic claims but also the rights of Filipino fishermen.

- For this reason, there is a need to explore countermeasures in order to preserve and protect said rights.

- One of the alternative options being explored is the utilization of PNARUs.

The Threat of China’s Maritime Militia

This year, the Department of Foreign Affairs has issued an uncommon public criticism concerning the swarming presence of over 200 Chinese vessels in a disputed area in the South China Sea called Sandy Cay.¹ The area is just three nautical miles away from Pagasa Island and is still within the territory of the Philippines. Dr. Jay Batongbacal, director of UP Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of Sea, states that its purpose is to take control of Sandy Cay – a new island that emerged from the sea because of China’s illegal dredging of Zamora Reef, one of the seven reefs that China has illegally developed into island fortresses.²

These boats are not just average fishing vessels China claims them to be. Rather, they are known to be part of China’s Maritime Militia. Their fishermen and marine industry workers are equipped, trained and deployed to do covert operations in order to “advance territorial and
maritime claims.” Found mostly in the regions of South and East China Sea, they operate to safeguard maritime claims through what is referred to as gray zone operations. This entails illegitimate activities like illegal occupation and militarization of island features; unlawful extraction of natural marine resources; and in this case, harassment of Filipino fishermen and obstruction of their fishing activities as aided by their navy and coastguard.

Taking all of these into account, how will the Philippines counter and mitigate these external threats, which have become more hostile in recent times?

**Examining the PNARUs**

During a lecture on China’s gray zone operations in South China Sea, Dr. Batongbacal was asked a question regarding a possible alternative countermeasure to the increasingly aggressive Chinese Maritime Militia. The question goes ‘can we use our afloat Philippine Navy Affiliated Reserve Units (PNARUs) to counter the Chinese Maritime Militia, beating them at their own game?’ He was quick to answer no, citing that their numbers alone would make it difficult, even impossible, to counter and defeat.

However, in the spirit of continuing the discussion, we shall interrogate the question. Is it possible to utilize the PNARUs the same way China has utilized their maritime militia in gray zone operations?

We should ponder on these questions in the interest of developing a long-term alternative strategy. COL BOB APOSTOL’s 2018 thesis paper “A Potent Force: Utilization of Seafarer Reservists in Development Support Operations, including Special Operations” explored the possibility of using the Philippines’ reservists in operations that are unconventional and special in nature. He mentioned the extensive knowledge of PNARUs in advanced seafaring technology. They are skilled in manning ships with advance engines and machineries, as well as in handling high-tech seafaring systems and electronic ship equipment. Further, they are capable in repairing and maintaining ships and have provided these kinds of services to the Philippine Navy, for free. For this reason, they are usually tapped to provide consultancy service and training to navy personnel as well as participate in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. Aside from these, PNARUs are also utilized for information gathering during their deployment in the seas. Although the PN facilitates Information Collection Training (ICT) for their capability build up, there is a need to enhance their training programs and such should be geared towards the development of techniques in internal security, control and defense. Nonetheless, a periodic maintenance training is conducted to ensure the operational readiness of PNARUs.

In addition, LT JERMAINE DACANAY, the former Training and Doctrine Officer of the Naval Reserve Command Training Center, points out that we cannot tailor fit the PNARUs in special operations; we are to utilize them according to what is written in the law. He refers to Republic Act 7077 “Citizen Armed Forces of the Philippine Reservist Act.” In Article 3 Section 10 of the law, it states that affiliated reserve units are specifically employed to guarantee “continuous and uninterrupted” delivery of public services such as water, light, transportation and communications essential in the pursuit of “national security plans” or to meet emergencies. They are trained and skilled in information gathering, but they are still limited by the parameters mandated by the law and should only be utilized in line with the operations of their company.

He also stresses that PNARUs are, by virtue, only volunteers that provide services without salary. To utilize them in special operations will be impossible since they do not have the appropriate training for it, and they are not compensated. He adds that in addressing internal and external threats, the PNARUs are not the first
responders. The first ones to address these threats are our regular force. The PNARUs may be knowledgeable in ship-handling, but they are not capable of special military operations; they are not trained in this area.

**Looking Ahead: Utilizing our PNARUs for Territorial Defense**

Given this, we can concur that we still have a long way to go in terms of training, equipping, and financially supporting our PNARUs to enable them for special operations. The utilization of PNARUS in special operations remains a novelty. However, the concept of employing civilian armed forces in this area is neither new nor impossible. We have the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU), for example. Recently granted with financial support through Executive Order 69 in 2018, CAFGUs are mandated to support the regular force through providing “military intelligence, joining traditional and non-traditional military operations, securing conflict-affected communities, and acting as first responders during natural disasters.”

In another example, Naval Forces Western Mindanao (NAVFORWEM) has recruited 196 men from different fishing companies as Special CAFGU Active Auxiliary (SCAA). Equipped and trained in Basic Military Training, doctrine and policies, they serve as the eyes and ears of different ships that are doing business operations down south. Because of SCAAs, NAVFORWEM was able to capture Omar Amping and 5 other people alleged to be part of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).6

The suggestion to utilize PNARUs to counter the Chinese Militia begs the question of whether we are finally prepared to transition from internal security operations to territorial defense or if we are still uncertain in proceeding with the development and transformation of our armed forces. We must understand that in building a responsive naval force fully capable of territorial defense, it should extend to our reserve units. They may not be the first responders, but they are our force multipliers. The current provisions of our law limit the utilization of PNARUs but their employment for information collection speaks of their potential as a counter measure to external threats, and even as a support unit to the PN. Nonetheless, we can still look into how we can utilize them in support of our naval operations in protecting our territorial claims and strategic interests.

**END NOTES:**


2 Ibid


On July 26, 2018, President Rodrigo Duterte made a significant legacy under his term as he signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), leading to the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), while at the same time fulfilling his promise to his fellow Mindanao people. This will replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which former President Benigno Aquino III called a “failed experiment”. BARMM comprises five provinces (formerly part of ARMM), three cities, 116 towns, and 63 barangays of North Cotabato. This was determined through a plebiscite on inclusion to the region.

Like many laws, it evolved from the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), the 2015 Bangsamoro Basic Law, also known as Bangsamoro Autonomous Region Law, up to the latest 2018 Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (OLBARMM), or the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) under the Duterte administration.

Among other rebel groups, it was mainly the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who worked cooperatively with the government for the establishment of this region. Because of this,
they presently serve as the lead in the region’s interim government. This, of course, entailed a lot of compromise. For one, the BARMM is only granted autonomy and not independence—which was the initial goal of the MILF. They also pledged for a permanent peace agreement with the government under the conditions of “decommission(ing) their armed wing and relinquish(ing) their weapons”. Nevertheless, on a positive note, this decision of the group could serve as a credible example to other armed groups that struggling for rights in Muslim Mindanao should not necessarily entail armed conflicts.

At present, BARMM is undergoing its three-year transition period and is awaiting the release of the 1.2 billion peso transition fund, as well as the transfer of the 32 billion peso ARMM budget for 2019 to BARMM handled by the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA). The BTA is the region’s interim government, composed of 75 appointed officials, headed by an interim Chief Minister and a Wali. This transition governance will end at 2022 when the first election of the region had been held.

The Struggle for Peace in Muslim Mindanao

Mindanao is as beautiful as all other regions in the country, but it struggles to realize its full potential because of protracted conflicts. According to Bhattacharji, “the southern Philippines have long been a breeding ground for terrorist activity” that since 2006, it has been considered by the U.S. State Department as a “terrorist safe haven.” Islamic separatists, communist nationalists, and extremists have been fighting the government for decades—proving how powerful rebel ideologies can be.

However, what makes BARMM different from previous peace processes is that it represents a huge step to compensate for the self-determination that has been taken away from the Muslims since the period of Spanish colonization in the Philippines.

Since the revision of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the struggle to establish a lasting peace in the southern region has always been the priority of every president that assumed leadership. Presently, this government’s initiative to implement the BARMM as an effective conflict management program in Mindanao has come a very long way, leading to this most progressive version yet. But despite its strong and promising beginning, the Jolo church bombing that had happened days later after the plebiscite instantly made everybody worried of its status and had skeptics questioning the effectivity of BARMM.

Both the MILF and MNLF have pledged to fight these extremist groups in the region, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and other ISIS factions. But apart from this, the struggle for peace also requires elimination of the communist-nationalists’ presence in and beyond the southern region, particularly the Communist People’s Party (CPP) and its military wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), with its organized structure, arguably, imposing a greater threat than the Islamist groups.

Conclusion

“BARMM holds many promises but it also poses numerous uncertainties.”

The transition period is the most crucial part of the process in this new geopolitical entity, as it prepares the stage for the BARMM. The BTA and the MILF are expected to face the hardest part of the peace process, which is to prove their credibility and capability to govern effectively. The MILF’s transition from a revolutionary group to a political group represents a huge turning point, and to cope with its lack of experience, MILF, alongside BTA, are set to undergo workshops and trainings in governance with the help of the local and international community.

This transition would also imply the BARMM’s
inheritance of ARMM’s previous shortcomings. Hence, this means that BARMM would also have to provide solutions to existing socio-political issues ARMM failed to address. For example, the disunity between the rebel groups MILF and MNLF is a continuing concern. These two groups are the leading peace propagators in the region, however, Nur Misuari and his MNLF faction have decided not to partake in the BOL and BTA. This decision not to involve his faction would serve as a challenge for the BTA to gain the support of other armed groups.

Also, the lingering societal divisions in Muslim Mindanao continue to hinder the peace process. Such cultural (tribal and ethnic) divides are still prevalent, serving as “gridlocks” to the region’s development.12

To achieve the promises set for BARMM, BTA should avoid making the same mistakes ARMM committed. Failure to resolve said uncertainties will ultimately result to the failure of achieving peace in Muslim Mindanao. Hence, higher expectations have to be met in order to fully gain the participation and support not only of the region, but the whole nation. The success of BARMX will promote sustainability in the region, promote peace in the country, and demonstrate the promise of decentralization of power as a template for genuine autonomous governance. 

END NOTES:

4 Supra Note 2.
5 Ibid.
9 Ibid.

About the Authors

Nikka V. Castolo, Hamdanie M. Sultan and Jacquelyn A. Tiu are undergraduate students of BA in International Studies at the Far Eastern University. They served as interns at the Office of Naval Strategic Studies from June to July 2019.
01 July 2019 – The ONSS conducts its 4th Teatime on "The Strategic Dimension of China’s Gray Zone Operations in the West Philippine Sea" with Dr. Renato De Castro, Professor of International Studies at De La Salle University. Dr. Dr Castro discusses that the political and strategic culture behind China’s gray zone campaigns works around the idea of “winning without fighting”, part of ancient Chinese statecraft which remains heavily embedded in China’s foreign policy presently.

02 August 2019 – The ONSS delivered a lecture on the "History of Aviation in the Philippines" to the Naval Aviation Officer Course 10 and 11 of the Naval Air Wing, Philippine Navy.
08 August 2019 – The ONSS conducts its 5th Teatime on entitled, “Mga Negosyo at Paraan ng Pagmamanman ng Hapon sa Pilipinas bago ang Ikalawang Digmaang Pandaigdig at ang Estratihikong Aral nito sa Kasalukuyan” with guest speaker, Ms. Bella Joy Bardollas, Professor of History at Enderun Colleges.

15-16 August 2019 – The ONSS presented its papers in the 4th Katipunan Conference with the theme, “Strategic Transformations and Responses in the Asia Pacific”. The event was organized by the Strategic Studies Program of the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS). The Katipunan Conference annually gathers practitioners and academics engaged in the security sector and serves as a platform for the discussion of relevant security issues that impact on Philippine foreign policy and the strategic environment.
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Headquarters Philippine Navy,
Naval Station Jose Andrada
2335 Roxas Boulevard, Manila
Tel: (632) 524 – 2061 to 69 loc. 6343
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